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To understand why natural philosophy played such a fundamental role in medieval intellectual life, we must view it in the context within which it was born in Western Europe. Before the introduction in the twelfth century of Aristotle’s works, which formed the solid foundation on which medieval natural philosophy was built, natural philosophy was a marginal activity based upon two-thirds of Plato’s Timaeus, Calcidius’s commentary on that treatise, and what relevant works might be available from a few Roman authors and one or more of the Latin encyclopedists: Boethius, Macrobius, Martianus Capella, Isidore of Seville, Cassiodorus, and a few others. With such an intellectual fare, Western Europe would not have gone far. 
But even before the introduction of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, Western Europe was already undergoing a momentous transformation, one that was destined to shape its attitude toward the world until the present day, and that will continue to shape its outlook into the foreseeable future. I speak about the conscious desire of many scholars to follow the path of reason, as opposed to authority. In a Christian society founded upon faith and revealed truth, the new attitude was startling. We can see it as early as the ninth century, when John Scotus Eriugena (in his On the Division of Nature [De divisione naturae], declared that:
authority proceeds from true reason, but reason certainly does not proceed from authority. For every authority which is not upheld by true reason is seen to be weak, whereas true reason is kept firm and immutable by her own powers and does not require to be confirmed by the assent of any authority. For it seems to me that true authority is nothing else but the truth that has been discovered by the power of reason and set down in writing by the Holy Fathers for the use of posterity.​[1]​
Eriugena’s attitude was undoubtedly reinforced by the increasing emphasis on Boethian logic that emerged by the eleventh century. By the twelfth century, logic was the preeminent discipline of the liberal arts. This extraordinary phenomenon is partially explicable by the fact that prior to the translations of Greco-Islamic science and natural philosophy in the mid-twelfth century, few treatises were available in natural philosophy, theology, medicine, and law. The old logic, which had been handed down from Boethius, may have helped fill the intellectual void and provide some fare for hungry intellects. In the chaotic political and economic world of the tenth and eleventh centuries, R.W.Southern has suggested that logic “opened a window on to an orderly and systematic view of the world and of man's mind.”​[2]​ In its rigor and organization, logic stood in sharp contrast to the disarray of subjects like theology and law, which over the centuries, had become filled with contradictions and inconsistencies. Logic was a model for the simplification and more rigorous organization of these vital subject areas.  But it was indispensable for the study of philosophy, as Hugh of St.Victor explained when he declared that 
logic came last in time, but is first in order. It is logic which ought to be read first by those beginning the study of philosophy, for it teaches the nature of words and concepts, without both of which no treatise of philosophy can be explained rationally.​[3]​
In the absence of a substantive natural philosophy, logic seems to have captured the attention of the new breed of teachers and scholars who came to prominence by the beginning of the twelfth century. As the human activity on which logic depends, reason was accorded a new respect and a new status. 
It was not long before the sense of power that Boethian logic conferred upon its practitioners would produce one other enormous change in Western attitudes. The idea of using that logic to elucidate theology and matters of faith. The process was underway in the eleventh century with the likes of Berengar of Tours (ca. 1000-1088) and Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). The application of reason to theological problems eventually won widespread support in the twelfth century because the basis for such a dramatic move had already been made in the eleventh century. 
No one exemplifies the new approach to theology better than Peter Abelard, who believed strongly that philosophy should be used to defend the faith against heretics and unbelievers. He regarded divine authority as supreme. But, like Anselm, he thought logic and reason were essential to understand the faith one accepted on the basis of authority. He sought wherever possible to explain articles of faith by reason and rational argument. Indeed, he believed that defense of the faith required the use of reason. “Those who attack our faith,” he declared, 
assail us above all with philosophical reasonings. It is those reasonings which we have principally enquired into and I believe that no one can fully understand them without applying himself to philosophical and especially to dialectical studies.​[4]​
Roger French and Andrew Cunningham have accurately described the attitude of Peter Abelard and those who followed when they declared that theology for Peter Abelard
and then to generations of others, was a matter of dialectical argumentation, not of insight gained by meditation, nor the decisions of episcopal or other authoritative sources. This ‘theology’ was therefore quite different from the sapientia of the monasteries. For in this ‘theology’ mystery and revealed truth were to be investigated by the test of reason.​[5]​ 
Despite opposition from traditionally minded theologians, such as Peter Damian, Rupert of Deutz, Bernard of Clairvaux, and William of Saint Thierry, Peter Abelard’s attitude triumphed. By the end of the twelfth-century, the issue was no longer in doubt. The new learning that poured into Europe from Islam and the Byzantine Empire proved decisive. It provided a vast storehouse of science and natural philosophy on which Western scholars could draw and by which they could be guided. They could now exercise their penchant for the reasoned approach to learning, both secular and theological. Those who shared the outlook of Peter Damian and Bernard of Clairvaux were simply overwhelmed and bypassed, although another serious disagreement would emerge during the thirteenth century over the relationship between faith and Aristotelian natural philosophy.  
The entry of Aristotle’s works into Europe was no accident, except in the fortuitous sense that his works happened to be available in the Islamic and Byzantine lands adjacent to the West. It was the direct outcome of a Europe that had already, from the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, become intellectually aroused and eager for learning. The new quest for the life of the mind was driven by an extraordinary desire to consciously employ human reason as the means by which to interpret the physical and spiritual worlds. The new emphasis on reason and rationality had emerged by the eleventh and twelfth centuries following a lengthy evolutionary transformation from the earlier centuries of the Roman Empire. They became permanent and characteristic features of the Latin Middle Ages. The wide-spread, conscious reliance on reason, and reasoned argument, in medieval Western society seems to have had no counterpart in any other civilization about which we have any knowledge. Why this occurred is simply unknown, and is perhaps ultimately inexplicable. 
Whatever the cause of it, the emphasis on reason in the twelfth century is a phenomenon of the greatest importance. We must not view it as some sort of revival, or renaissance, of an earlier time when reason may have played a significant role in the West. There was really no such time. Reason as a self-conscious driving force in learning and in society had never occurred in the West until the twelfth century. Once established, however, reason came to play a large and significant role, and has remained a major driving force in the West to the present day. 
The emergence of reason, however, was not just a matter of applying logic to arguments. It was equally a matter of systematizing knowledge. It was this thrust to simplify and organize knowledge that resulted in the systematization of theology, as evidenced by the Sentences of Peter Lombard; and the systematization of canon law as shown by Gratian’s Decretum. Aristotelian natural philosophy had entered a society that was already strongly attracted to reasoned argument, but which had previously had little substantive natural philosophy on which to exercise its new and powerful analytic tool.
 Aristotelian natural philosophy could not have fallen on more fertile soil. With the emergence of universities by the end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth centuries, natural philosophy would be institutionalized and made a part of European higher education in a way that had never occurred before in the history of civilization. In the thirteenth century, natural philosophy in the universities would be organized and systematized in the same rationalistic manner as theology and law had been in the twelfth century; and, in its new form, would be widely disseminated as never before. By 1500, every student in Western Europe who attended one of the more than seventy universities scattered across Europe, from Lisbon in the West to Cracow and Buda in the East, studied the medieval version of Aristotle’s natural philosophy.​[6]​ Ancient Greece, the Byzantine Empire and Islam had never witnessed anything like it.
But just what was it that was institutionalized in the universities of medieval Europe? What is natural philosophy? Is it science, or a particular science? It could not represent a single science, because, as its name suggests, the domain of natural philosophy is the whole of nature. Natural philosophy was not a single science, but was rather all sciences, because it embraced bits and pieces of all sciences. We may thus appropriately characterize natural philosophy as “The Mother of All Sciences.”​[7]​ For example, John Buridan, one of the most important natural philosophers in the Middle Ages, offered cogent explanations of earthquakes and mountain formation in his questions on Aristotle’s On the Heavens and in his Questions on the First Three Books of the Meteors.​[8]​ Anyone writing a history of geology would be obligated to include Buridan’s opinions as part of the overall history of the subject. And yet there was no discipline of geology until the eighteenth or nineteenth century. Indeed, Aristotle’s Meteorology served as the focal point for numerous questions about possible motions of the earth, about the ebb and flow of oceans, about lightning, and other themes that were discussed in natural philosophy long before any specific sciences had emerged to claim one or another of these subjects. In their commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and On the Heavens, scholastic natural philosophers presented significant discussions about the causes of motion centuries before the advent of a recognized science of mechanics. Even as late as the nineteenth century, we get a strong sense of natural philosophy as the mother of all sciences. We need only recall that the term “natural philosophy” was often equated with physical science; or the physical sciences were subsumed under the term “natural philosophy.” According to Jed Buchwald (in his article on William Thomson in the DSB, vol. 12, p. 386), William Thomson and Peter Guthrie Tait published two volumes in the nineteenth century on kinematics and dynamics, which they titled Treatise on Natural Philosophy. But in that century, a much broader concept of natural philosophy existed. Dickinson College, for example, issued a catalogue, which declared that 
Natural philosophy may be considered as the science which examines the general and permanent properties of bodies; the laws which govern them, and the reciprocal action which these bodies are capable of exerting upon each other, at greater or less distances, without changing their matter.”​[9]​
And under the rubric of natural philosophy we find an array of sciences, including mechanics, hydrostatics, hydrodynamics, hydraulics, pneumatics, acoustics, optics, astronomy, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, and chromatics.​[10]​ 
Although medieval natural philosophy was broader than what appears in Aristotle’s natural philosophy  it would, for example, include alchemy and astrology  Aristotle’s works, and the innumerable and varied commentaries on those works, form its core. If the emphasis on reason in Western Europe and its use as an analytical tool preceded the introduction of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, the advent of Aristotle’s works must nevertheless have struck its European audience as the ultimate embodiment of reasoned argument. 
What would they have learned from Aristotle’s works? They would discover that Aristotle believed profoundly in the rationality of the universe; that he elevated reason and thought to the highest level of activity in the universe, and that he relied on reason to understand and resolve problems and organize his thoughts.​[11]​ But it is not only an abstract elevation of reason to the highest level of human activity that makes Aristotle so important for the subsequent history of rationality in Western thought. It is rather the way he actually used reason to solve problems, and his unceasing efforts to arrive at truth by the careful consideration of evidence and alternative arguments. Aristotle was instinctively a rationalistic thinker whose treatises are models of reasoned argumentation. What Aristotle conveyed to his readers in the Latin Middle Ages was a way of approaching problems and an overall system of the world that was embedded in his various works. Although his system of the world was of the greatest importance to medieval scholars, who saw the world through his eyes, it is Aristotle’s method of investigating problems that taught medieval natural philosophers how to use reason in their inquiries about the operations of the physical world. Thus it was as much the way Aristotle said things, as what he said, that shaped the mode and manner of medieval inquiry into natural philosophy. In lieu of an historical context, Aristotle often approaches problems as puzzles (aporia) to be solved, where it is important to identify difficulties and to present possible solutions.​[12]​ 
Aristotle undoubtedly had what we might call the “scientific temperament.” He sought to be objective and detached and almost always gives the appearance of wanting to examine all relevant evidence for every problem. Above all, however, he sought to arrive at true generalizations and categorizations. Indeed, he always seems to divide and categorize things, whether dealing with knowledge, animals, or inanimate objects and their changes and motions. His division and analysis of knowledge played a monumental role in the history of thought and the use of reason. The works of Aristotle were absorbed into Western thought in the course of the thirteenth century. They proved a powerful model. As a separate discipline distinct from theology, medieval natural philosophy was a part of philosophy, and “philosophy,” as Thomas Aquinas put it, “is based on the natural light of reason.”​[13]​ 
With Aristotle’s works as their model, it can come as no surprise that medieval natural philosophy was a highly organized, rationalistic enterprise. Medieval scholastics elaborated on Aristotle’s model and extended natural philosophy beyond what Aristotle envisioned. Organized primarily around the questio, each question was a systematically organized inquiry, which needs no further discussion here. 
WAS MEDIEVAL NATURAL PHILOSOPHY ABOUT GOD AND THE FAITH?
Given the central role of Christianity and revealed religion in the Middle Ages, was natural philosophy a rational discipline, or something quite different? In an article published in 1991, Andrew Cunningham regards the traditional problem about the mutual influences of science, or natural philosophy, and religion as pointless, 
“because they depend for their validity on religion and natural philosophy having been seen as separate from each other in the past as religion and science are seen as being today.”​[14]​ 
Instead, we should recognize that natural philosophy was 
about God and His creation, because that is what the point of natural philosophy as a discipline and subject was. Hence each and every variety of natural philosophy that was put forward was an argument for particular and specific views of God. In other words, what we should be looking at (in my view) is not the ‘influence’ of their religion on their natural philosophies (or vice versa), but on how their particular religious outlooks and goals were constitutive of their particular natural philosophies.​[15]​
And near the conclusion of his article, Cunningham proclaims that 
“natural philosophy as such was a discipline and subject-area whose role and point was the study of God’s creation and God’s attributes.”​[16]​ 
While I doubt that this is an accurate depiction of natural philosophy in the seventeenth century, which is the main focal point of Cunningham’s article, it is a completely erroneous description when applied to medieval natural philosophy. Let us see why. 
To begin with, theology and natural philosophy were distinct disciplines in the Middle Ages, each taught in its own university faculty. Hence it is completely appropriate to treat them as distinct disciplines. To do otherwise would distort their historic relationship. Is it true, as Cunningham claims, that natural philosophy is always about God, God’s attributes, and His creation? In the course of teaching and studying Aristotle's natural books in the arts faculties of medieval universities for more than three centuries, a vast body of commentary literature was produced.​[17]​  Those who wrote these treatises firmly believed that, by His supernatural power, God had created the world from nothing, and was the ultimate cause of all events or effects. How did these religious beliefs affect the way medieval scholars wrote natural philosophy? Did it mean that their objective in doing natural philosophy was essentially theological or religious; that their aim was to transform natural philosophy into an instrument for the defense of the faith and therefore to intrude as much religious material as possible into their investigations into natural questions? 
The best way to respond to these questions and judge the impact of God and religion on natural philosophy is to examine relevant documents and base our judgments on the texts of natural philosophy as written by those who were consciously doing natural philosophy, not theology. That is, we must carefully inspect treatises on natural philosophy per se, not treatises on theology that used natural philosophy in the service of theology. To achieve this I examined all 59 questions in John Buridan’s Questions on De caelo; the 35 questions in Albert of Saxony’s Questions on On Generation and Corruption; the 107 questions in Albert of Saxony’s Questions on the Physics; the 65 questions in Themon Judaeus’s Questions on the Meteors; and the 44 questions in Nicole Oresme’s Questions on De anima, for a grand total of 310 questions. 
An examination of the 310 questions embedded in these five treatises shows clearly that most of the questions had little to do with God, the faith, or theology, but were concerned solely with issues in natural philosophy. By my count, 217 of the 310 questions are free of any entanglement with theology or faith. Inspection of any of the 217 questions would not reveal whether the author was Christian, Muslim, Jewish, agnostic, or atheist. The remaining 93 questions, approximately 29 percent, include at least one mention God and the faith. Of the 93 with at least a trace of theological sentiment, 53 mention God, or something about the faith, in a cursory manner; of the remaining 40 questions, 10 have relatively detailed discussions about God or the faith.   
Of the 93 instances where God and the faith are mentioned, 80 fall into three significant categories most of which appear in only three of the five treatises: Questions on the Physics, Questions on De caelo, and Questions on De anima (very few occur in Questions on Generation and Corruption and Questions on the Meteorology). Examination of such works on natural philosophy makes it apparent that in most instances where God and matters of faith are intruded into commentaries and questions on Aristotle's natural books, they occur primarily in one of three categories or contexts. 
Category 1: 
Twelve of the 93 questions mention arguments that are contrary to the faith, arguments that are usually drawn from the works of Aristotle or Averroes. For example, in his Questions on De anima (bk. 3, qu. 7), Nicole Oresme  argues against Averroes’ assumption of a single intellect, when he says that “the opposite is obvious from faith and according to truth. Nor is it probable -- indeed it is unthinkable -- that my intellect is your intellect or [the intellect] of another who is in Rome or elsewhere.”​[18]​ After presenting arguments for both sides of a question that inquires whether an immobile heaven should be assumed beyond the mobile heavens, that is, whether there is an empyrean heaven, John Buridan also invokes the faith and declares that “you may choose any side you please. But, because of the arguments of the theologians, I choose the first part [that is, the existence of a resting, empyrean heaven]. And one can reply to Aristotle’s argument that he assumes many things against Catholic truth because he wished to assume nothing that could not be deduced from the senses and experience. Thus it is not necessary to believe Aristotle in many things, namely where he clashes with Sacred Scripture.”​[19]​
Category 2:
Thirty-four questions mention God and faith for analogies or examples. Thus Oresme presents a supposition in which he says “that some power makes this or that operation anew without changing itself, just as is obvious with God who continuously produces new effects without any change in Himself.”​[20]​ Similarly, Buridan declares that “Just as all order in the world arises from God, so does order arise in a city from a prince.”​[21]​
Category 3:
Another 34 of the 93 questions are concerned with some aspect of God’s absolute power, which was the most significant source for manufacturing counterfactuals in the Middle Ages, some of which raised important questions about motion, other worlds, and the infinite. The numerous appeals to God’s absolute power bear witness to the fact that natural philosophy was not just about God and His creation, but also about what God had not created, but could create by virtue of His omnipotence. Among numerous invocations of God’s absolute power we may mention that God could create as many other worlds as He pleases; ​[22]​that He could move our world with a rectilinear motion;​[23]​ that He could separate a quantity from its extension;​[24]​ that beyond our world, He could create a corporeal space and any corporeal substances He pleases;​[25]​ and that God could create a vacuum by annihilating all matter below the concave surface of the lunar orb.​[26]​  In short, by His omnipotence, God was always assumed capable of doing anything whatever short of a logical contradiction.
What are we to make of all this? In my judgment, it shows that medieval natural philosophy was influenced only incidentally and marginally by theology. Natural philosophers were expected to identify contrary-to-faith arguments and label them as errors, as, for example, the eternity of the world and consequences derived therefrom. But only in 12 of the 310 questions did I find such instances. And even those instances occupied only a small part of the question itself. In this way, theology intruded on natural philosophy by setting certain constraints upon it. But natural philosophers also drew upon God and the faith for analogies and comparisons. This was a mere convenience since most authors could have replaced them with secular analogies and comparisons. Appeals to God’s absolute power were largely a consequence of the Condemnation of 1277, which seems to have induced fourteenth century natural philosophers, most of whom were secular arts masters when they wrote their relevant treatises, to invoke God’s absolute power to do many things that were naturally impossible in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. But the way medieval natural philosophers used God’s absolute power had virtually nothing to do with theology as such. It provided an endless source of counterfactuals, which served to raise important questions about motion, other worlds, and the infinite. It was a source of analytical games that encouraged natural philosophers to apply their imaginative skills to hypothetical conditions that few, if any, believed ever existed or would ever exist. Ironically, then, examples conjured up by appeals to God’s absolute power were not really about His creation, but rather about what He had not created, but could have created.  
Cunningham’s interpretation of natural philosophy cannot stand critical evaluation when applied to the late Middle Ages. Natural philosophy was never significantly infiltrated by theology and natural philosophy was never really about God and His attributes. It was, of course about God’s creation, but it was about that creation as a rational construction that could only be understood by the use of reason. John Buridan shows how medieval natural philosophers viewed their work. As a natural philosopher, Buridan was aware that his objective was to describe and explain nature’s operations in terms of natural causes and effects, and not to explicate God’s supernatural actions and miracles. Buridan had no problems with his faith. He accepted the truths of revelation as absolute, and acceded to them. But in keeping with the tradition of his fellow natural philosophers, he acknowledged that his task was to explicate problems about natural actions and phenomena, and not to deal with the supernatural. In treating a question as to whether every generable thing will be generated, Buridan immmediately acknowledges that one can treat this problem naturally  ‘as if the opinion of Aristotle were true concerning the eternity of the world, and that something cannot be made from nothing’  or supernaturally, wherein God could prevent a generable thing from generating naturally by simply annihilating it. ‘But now,’ Buridan declares, ‘with Aristotle, we speak in a natural mode, with miracles excluded.’​[27]​ Buridan believed that truth was attainable when ‘a common course of nature (communis cursus nature) is observed in things and in this way it is evident to us that all fire is warm and that the heaven moves, although the contrary is possible by God’s power.’​[28]​ Natural philosophers like Buridan were usually careful to concede that God could upset the natural order of things by direct intervention. That is why an expression such as the “common course of nature” was so useful. Natural philosophers were primarily interested in natural, not supernatural, powers, for which reason Buridan insisted that ‘in natural philosophy, we ought to accept actions and dependencies as if they always proceed in a natural way.’​[29]​ Although, by His absolute power, God could move an infinite body, Buridan regards it as obvious that Aristotle’s arguments ‘conclude sufficiently with respect to natural powers.’​[30]​ If he had to concede that God could use His absolute, unpredictable power to produce any natural impossibilities He wished, Buridan could still save Aristotle and natural philosophy by characterizing Aristotle’s arguments as sufficient in the real, natural world, the one he and his fellow natural philosophers sought to understand.
But another important argument tells against the intrusion of theology into natural philosophy. It is difficult to inject theology into explanations of natural phenomena. Whenever a theological explanation is given, it converts what should have been a natural explanation to a supernatural explanation and, consequently, has defeated the very purpose of a treatise on natural philosophy, which is to explain phenomena by natural causes. If this were done to any large extent, the treatise in question would no longer be a work in natural philosophy, but would have been converted to one on theology. To illustrate how difficult it is to inject theology into natural philosophy, I offer as evidence Sir Isaac Newton. In his monumental treatise in mathematical physics, The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, first published in 1687, Newton, a devout individual, found occasion to mention God only once in the entire work, in book three. Apparently regretting even this action, Newton deleted mention of God from that passage in subsequent editions.​[31]​ As if in replacement of that passage, Newton added his famous General Scholium at the end of the second edition (1713). In a work of 530 pages, Newton saw fit to discourse upon God only in the last four pages, where he praises the deity as the Universal Ruler and Supreme God, and enunciates some of God’s attributes. Coming to the end of his encomium on the deity, Newton declares: “And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy.”​[32]​ In the Middle Ages, when theology and natural philosophy were separate disciplines, it was the responsibility of theology, not natural philosophy, to discourse about God. But the Protestant Reformation and much else had destroyed the jurisdictional boundaries between theology and natural philosophy. When Newton wrote, it was regarded as wholly appropriate for a natural philosopher to discourse about God. And yet Newton found few places where he could do so substantively and effectively. Other than singing the praises of the deity, Newton found very little to say about God. Indeed, even the General Scholium was introduced only because of criticisms levelled against Newton’s use of attractions and repulsions, which made his system seem mechanical, much like that of Descartes.​[33]​ In the General Scholium, Newton emphasizes that only God could have produced the cosmos. “Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and everywhere, could produce no variety of things.”​[34]​ But after the conclusion of his worshipful tribute to God, Newton, in the final two paragraphs of his great work, admits that he has not yet found the cause of gravity. It is enough for us, he says, “that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea.”​[35]​ Why did Newton not attribute the cause of gravity to God? It would almost have followed from the immediately preceding three-page discourse on God’s power and attributes, as his brilliant biographer Richard S. Westfall recognized.​[36]​ But Newton did not do so. Why not? Probably because he recognized that such an explanation would have been to no avail. It would have explained nothing. If you believe that God has created our world and all of its operations, then you cannot invoke God to function as an explanation for the cause of any particular effect. You must assume that God provided a natural cause for that effect, and it is the task of the natural philosopher to discover it. Medieval theologians and natural philosophers, many of whom were both theologian and natural philosopher, recognized this essential feature of natural philosophy. It explains why, from the Middle Ages onward, natural philosophy remained relatively free of theological encroachments. And it also makes it very plausible to believe that natural philosophy is the real precursor of modern science. Its methods were rational and systematic by the very nature of the discipline. Theology and faith could not enter it in any significant manner because such an intrusion would have transformed natural philosophy into theology.
We must view the relations of medieval natural philosophy and theology as bilateral, though very unevenly bilateral, as we shall see. Much of the theology that was intruded into natural philosophy functioned as the handmaid to natural philosophy, because it served the needs of natural philosophy. This is especially true for the theology that was introduced for analogical and comparative purposes, as well as for the appeals to God’s absolute power, which enabled natural philosophers to extend the range of their discussions, while also reserving to themselves the option of rejecting the counterfactuals which God could produce if He wished. The theology that was intruded into treatises on natural philosophy was not theology for its own sake, but was solely intended to elucidate this or that question in natural philosophy. Only aspects of natural philosophy that were contrary-to-faith were affected by theological considerations. But the responses to these conditions, most of them associated with Aristotle’s arguments for an eternal world, became routine and did not affect the substantive character of natural philosophy. Following a perfunctory bow to faith, an author could assume the eternity of the world hypothetically and pursue a variety of arguments. Natural philosophy was largely unaffected by theology, and remained a highly rational discipline throughout the Middle Ages. Theology never transformed natural philosophy  
By contrast, when theology used natural philosophy in theological treatises, as it did on a massive scale, it viewed natural philosophy as its handmaid. The more natural philosophy that was imported into theology treatises, such as commentaries and questions on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, the more focused did theologians become on natural philosophy and therefore less concerned with the supernatural. Because of its heavy reliance on natural philosophy  some questions on the Sentences were almost exclusively devoted to natural philosophy  theology became a highly rationalistic discipline.  We may rightly conclude that whereas theology was dependent on natural philosophy, natural philosophy was largely independent of theology. 
DID MEDIEVAL NATURAL PHILOSOPHY PLAY A ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY MODERN SCIENCE?
We know that medieval Aristotelian natural philosophy was the major discipline for the study of nature for more than four centuries, before being replaced by the new science emerging in the seventeenth century. Did medieval natural philosophy play a role in the emergence of the early modern science that replaced it in the seventeenth century? Or was it the obstacle that had to be overcome before early modern science could see the light? To reply appropriately to this important question, we must first reiterate what was said earlier, that, although natural philosophy was not a single science, it included bits and pieces of many sciences. If natural philosophy was indeed the Mother of All Sciences, then surely the question is legitimate, because natural philosophy has an obvious connection to what would subsequently become this or that particular science. But what was the science that was scattered through medieval natural philosophy, and embedded within it, like? 
To answer this, we must understand what it was like to engage in scientific inquiry in the Middle Ages. Aspects of science that moderns take for granted did not form part of the methodology of medieval science. There was no careful, methodical observation of phenomena; no carefully controlled experiments; and no systematic application of mathematics to physical phenomena. Although significant instances of these fundamental activities of modern science can be found in the late Middle Ages, they were sporadic, never routine.
In a culture such as that of the Middle Ages, in which the tools for scientific research and inquiry just described were largely absent, how was nature to be interpreted and analyzed in order to arrive at some understanding of a world that would otherwise be unknowable and inexplicable? The most powerful weapon available was human reason, which they had seen Aristotle employ to construct principles and generalizations about the world based on a modicum of observation, often highly selective, to justify this or that generalization, or to build a generalization upon it. For the most part, however, Aristotle relied on a priori reasoning to form a picture of the structure and operation of the world. Logic and reason were the primary determinants used to understand the way the world had to be. In the ancient and medieval worlds, Aristotle’s works represented the apotheosis of reason. 
Medieval Latin scholars eagerly embraced Aristotle’s methodology and his approach to the physical world. In the historical development of science, the conscious application of reason to the natural world in the late Middle Ages in Western Europe ought to be viewed as the first step in a process that would eventually produce modern science. Without the systematic use of reason, science would be impossible. Of all the major methodological instruments that make modern science viable, reason was the first to emerge. It is found full-blown in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. But not until the thirteenth century in the universities of Western Europe was Aristotle’s natural philosophy made the basis of a deep-rooted, widely disseminated approach to nature. 
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